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THE ARMY'S SEARCH FOR TOMORROW--
WHY NOT A DOMESTIC SERVICE CORPS

Carl M. Putnam

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Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania

26 January 1973

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THE ARMY'S SEARCH FOR TOMORROW--
WHY NOT A DOMESTIC SERVICE CORPS?

AN INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH REPORT

by

Lieutenant Colonel Carl M. Putnam
Armor

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ABSTRACT

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The basic question is whether the Army could administer a modern day version of the Civilian Conservation Corps (Domestic Service Corps) without reducing its contribution to the national defense effort. The Domestic Service Corps (DSC) would combine unemployed youth and Army managerial talent to resolve the urban and environmental crisis. The end result would reduce the cost of the Army, unemployment, and mobilization time while increasing the size of the officer corps. Historical precedents revealed that the Army became involved in nationbuilding when (1) there was a recognized need; (2) the Army was the best vehicle for getting the job done; (3) the use of the Army was politically feasible. The lessons learned in a case study of the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) were used to postulate a DSC that would be the most favorable to Army participation. The study concludes that the Army could not administer a DSC and still contribute its share to national defense. However, low key participation on a cost reimbursable basis had several advantages and fewer disadvantages. Department of Army should closely examine the concept and be prepared to present the Army view should such a program be proposed.

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CHAPTER I

AN INSTITUTION UNDER FIRE

And they conspired all of them together to come to fight against Jerusalem and to do it injury.

And it came to pass from that day forth that the half of my young men wrought at work, while the other half of them were holding spears, the shield, and the coats of mail. . . .

And the builders had every one his sword fastened around his loin while they were building. . . .

Nehemiah 4

Those words of the prophet are taking on new meaning as the Nation proceeds with the reordering of its priorities. As the Vietnam war consumes less and less of our resources, the fight against the social ills that are plaguing our country gains momentum. One of the steps the President has taken to realign our priorities is to proclaim the Nixon Doctrine which reduces the Army's role in the overall National Defense Plan.

NIXON DOCTRINE

In July 1969, while the President was at Guam, he announced his concept for defense, which subsequently became known as the Nixon Doctrine. In a nutshell, the President stated that the United States would honor its treaty commitments; but we would weigh carefully the interest of the United States before taking on new commitments. The United States would also shun a "reflective response" to threats and conditions in the variegated context of modern Asia. Further, the

United States would take action to prevent nuclear blackmail of other countries while discouraging nations from developing their own nuclear capability. Finally, the President stated that our method of meeting non-nuclear forms of aggression would be to provide military and economic assistance while looking to the threatened nation to provide its own manpower for defense.¹ Implementation of the doctrine has already reduced the presence of the United States Armed Forces in the world by 550,000 men. Most of these forces were Army, and mostly in Vietnam.² As these forces return home they are demobilized and lost to the structure. Short of a total war with the People's Republic of China or the Soviet Union, the Nixon Doctrine implies a smaller standing Army to be backed by the "vast mobilization" potential of the United States.³

While this concept is similar to that set forth in the 1920 Defense Act, the country cannot hope for a leisurely mobilization as we had in World War II. In the past, the United States could go to war, and two great oceans provided protection while the country built up the forces necessary to fight the conflict. In this modern day, technology has caused the world to shrink and oceans are no longer a barrier to the enemy. To counter this, the country must find ways to shorten the time it takes to mobilize. One way to do this is for the Army to have a large, well-trained, Active Duty Officer Corps upon which to expand the Army. The question then arises how to keep that corps gainfully employed in peacetime. One school of thought is: use the Army to run a modern day Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC). For the purpose of this study, that corps will be called the Domestic Service Corps (DSC).

There are several problem areas in which the DSC could help the nation. These include reducing the defense budget, resolving the urban crisis, reducing unemployment, and reducing the time necessary to mobilize the defense potential of the United States. A short discussion of each of these areas will establish a foundation for the examination of Army participation in a DSC.

The most important public demand facing the nation is to increase the amount of funds available to resolve social welfare problems. There are two alternatives, either raise taxes or reduce defense spending. Increasing taxes is not politically feasible, so the latter course of action must be taken.

BUDGET

In proclaiming the Nixon Doctrine the President was responding to that public demand to realign national priorities and reduce defense spending. For the first time in 30 years, the country spent more money on domestic social programs than on defense.⁴ This new priority of spending has relegated defense to tenth place in a listing of thirteen national priorities. In ten years the defense share of the gross national product has decreased from 9.8 percent to 8.5 percent and is still sagging. According to the National Planning Association (NPA), the new priority was established (by a clamor from citizens) to cut down on foreign aid, spend proportionately less on technology and defense, and to provide more funds for human welfare. The NPA also stated that there was growing doubt that simply spending

money would provide an answer to the nation's social problems. Perhaps a combination of funds, Army managerial talent, and the nation's youth could be used to resolve the urban crisis.

URBAN CRISIS

The country's urban crisis is a complex of social problems whose solutions must be provided on a national basis. Actions to resolve the problem must be immediate before the situation becomes worse. Simultaneously with the sharp growth of American population in recent years, the technological revolution in agriculture released many thousands of farmworkers from gainful employment. The new citizens and excess farmworkers along with their families moved to the cities in search of jobs. The result was that each year the population of America's metropolitan areas grew by over three million people, a growth too fast for the slower construction rate of dwelling and other facilities. The central cities became ghettos with badly crowded housing, unemployment, poor medical care, and inadequate diets.⁵ To make matters worse, it is predicted that 80 percent of the United States' population will be living in urban areas by the year 2000.⁶

Organized Labor believes that the Congress must recognize both the urgency and the magnitude of the task. Action should be taken to replace the ghettos by providing new or rehabilitated housing.⁷ Labor further states that the cure for the urban crisis requires a national effort under federal leadership and a maximum input of resources applied.⁸ The ALF-CIO attributes most of the urban crisis to the lack of jobs at decent wages.⁹ Yet Labor cannot offer concrete solutions to the problem.

UNEMPLOYMENT

There is little argument with AFL-CIO that the lack of jobs is causing nationwide problems and contributing heavily to the urban crisis. In August 1972, the country's overall unemployment rate was 5.5 percent. Within that 5.5 percent rate, 14.8 percent was between 16 and 19 years of age. The next highest group of 9.9 percent was among the Blacks, mostly in the ghetto.¹⁰ The last two categories, the Blacks and teenagers, are full of ideals and hopes for eradication of the slum conditions and all the ills that go with those deficiencies. In reality, the situation is worse. There are other persons that cannot find regular employment due to a lack of education or training. In 1969, an AFL-CIO estimate states that 40-50 percent of out-of-school teenagers were unemployed. Nearly 7 percent of those working were employed only part time.¹¹ The nation must insure jobs for such unemployed and underemployed, many of whom have already given up the search for work.¹² Resolution of this problem can be an expensive process; but the cost will be cheaper than riots, public welfare, and juvenile delinquency.¹³ Perhaps a national program to provide jobs for unemployed youths similar to CCC would be an answer.

REDUCTION IN FORCE

It is ironic that with this serious unemployment problem, the Army was releasing a half million men back into society. This action was taken to reduce personnel costs which is a major item in the defense budget. In two years time, the Army was reduced from

one-and-a-third million men to an authorized manning level of 841,000.¹⁴ There is a strong possibility that the authorized level will be further reduced to 829,000 men.¹⁵ A sad result of this reduction was the 1972 loss of 5,000 young officers who were involuntarily released from Active Duty. These young men, proven in combat, had experience in managing people, machines, and other valuable resources under the most austere of conditions. In short, these officers were a valuable asset, not only to the Army should it be forced to rapidly expand in size again as quickly as it did for Vietnam, but to the nation as well. True, some of these officers were substandard, but a great many were victims of circumstances. My discussions with members of the Army's Office of Personnel Operations (purposely left unnamed) revealed that the time allotted for the reduction did not allow selective release in every case. This was confirmed by the National Guard Bureau in a letter to the State Adjutant Generals which stated that the Army "forced many quality officers off Active Duty."¹⁵

In the context of modern technology, the Army must have adequate leadership. Yet, quality officers take years to develop. As early as the 1930s, General MacArthur pointed out that skilled officers are the product of continuous and laborious study.¹⁶ We cannot turn the supply of officers on and off as easily as Congress would like.

The Army's image and prestige is at a low ebb as the result of failures in leadership such as at My Lai and the publicity surrounding unsuccessful development programs such as the CHEYENNE helicopter and main battle tank, not to mention the Army's major role in an

unpopular war. Many of these failures can be attributed to the insufficient number of trained officers available for mobilization when the expansion of the Army began. This is not a new problem, but the Congress never seems to appreciate the parameters involved.

THE NATIONAL DILEMMA

The solution to the social ills of our nation require the same costly resources, manpower, and managerial talent that is required to insure the national defense. According to public opinion, these resources should be used to resolve the urban problem rather than on national defense. There is no argument that this cost detracts from the development of this nation. On the other hand, as long as world domination remains the goal of communism regardless of how many or where the ideological centers are located, the threat exists and is growing stronger while the United States Army grows weaker militarily. In the public eye, neither war nor national defense is sufficient justification for an Army. Therefore the nation is now faced with a dilemma.

Perhaps the answer is the formation of a Domestic Service Corps combining civilian leadership, Army management, and compulsory service by the youth of the country. The cost of the Army could be minimized by increasing the utility of its personnel to society and the nation. In other words, let the people know that they are getting their money's worth. The real challenge to the leaders of this country is to combine the Army's managerial talent and the ideals of our youth with the

requirements for national defense and to direct the combined force toward achieving the social, political, and economic goals which contribute to improving the quality of American life.

The Army would also gain by having a larger pool of experienced officers available for mobilization. Time and time again it has been proven that the country needs a large base of well-trained officers during times of mobilization. In 1940, the shortage of skilled officers which had been forecast for at least ten years by the Army General Staff became a reality.¹⁷ This forecast had been based on similar shortages for World War I. Obtaining this base of officers has never been possible because the Army could not justify their peacetime utilization to the satisfaction of Congress. Perhaps in times of peace the officers excess to actual day to day Army needs could be used for managing elements of a Domestic Service Corps. The officers could be rotated so that schooling and military training would have a share of the overall time. The military opposition to such a plan centers around the assumption that domestic service is not and should not be the role of the Army. However, it could be that the officers corps needs to re-examine its total purpose along the lines expressed in recent Army Times article:

With the advent of the nuclear age, power and the ability to inflict death can no longer have any central meaning to the individual military man as a measure of his worth and the contribution to his country.¹⁸

QUESTIONS

There are several questions the Army should be prepared to answer in detail should Congress or the President decide to evaluate the DSC concept. In the 1930s the Army had examined the unemployment relief problem and was able to soften the impact of running the CCC when that role was assigned as an additional mission.

Could the Army participate in running a Domestic Service Corps and still provide its share for the defense of the United States? Assuming that question is answered in the affirmative, how should the Army participate? Finally, what advantages for the Army would accrue from participating in such a program. Maybe this participation will allow the nation to have a numerically larger Army while reducing the overall cost of the Army.

THE STUDY

With these ideas in mind, the bibliography for this study was assembled by searching the card files of both the United States Army War College Library and the United States Army Military History Research Collection. After careful analysis of books, references and articles pertaining to the use of military forces in civic action, nationbuilding and the Civilian Conservation Corps, the following organization of facts was found to be the best for presenting the study results.

Chapter II, "Manifest Destiny," examines the contribution the military made in the development and expansion of the United States from the Atlantic to the Pacific Oceans. The discussion covers the

the Army assisting in providing security, maintaining law and order, exploration, science, education of civilians, engineering, economics, and social welfare. Of necessity, the discussion is short, but sufficient to establish that there is a precedent for the Army becoming involved in nationbuilding activities. Chapter III, "Civilian Conservation Corps," examines the events surrounding the organization and operation of the Civilian Conservation Corps. In this area, the research was directed toward uncovering the pitfalls, successes, and clues that would assist in organizing a similar program in today's environment. Chapter IV, "Domestic Service Corps," outlines a radical approach to a national solution to the several problems. The Army becomes involved in the nation's struggle to cure its social ills.

TENTATIVE CONCLUSION

The writer tentatively concludes that the Army can make a major contribution to the manual reconstruction of urban areas, the mental rejuvenation of the underprivileged in the society and the cleanup of the environment. Not only can this be accomplished while maintaining a sound posture for defense, but there are several benefits that will improve the Army's readiness.

ASSUMPTIONS

The assumptions for this study are extremely important. The first two may even brand the author as a heretic. If so, so be it.

The Volunteer Army concept will fail because of the lack of funds to support it, the inability of the Army to perform its assigned mission with the small number of volunteers available, and the necessity to close the gap that was developing between the military and civilian communities. Congress must seek new incentives to prevent renewal of the Selective Service Act.

In 1967, George Meany, as President of the AFL-CIO, stated, "America must have over one million jobs in socially productive work for the presently unemployed."¹⁹ Can Labor or will Labor solve the pressing problems of training and integrating the poverty elements into an acceptable place in our national development? The writer assumes that Labor will not tackle the problem, that the problem will continue to grow and that Congress will be forced to pass a bill setting up a meaningful program over Labor's objections. Thus, the objections of Labor are not discussed in this study.

Finally, the writer assumes the Nixon Doctrine will be enforced, and the Army will not become involved in a land war in the near future.

LIMITATIONS

Time does not permit a comprehensive study of every Army program, so programs such as the Army's integration efforts and drug abuse programs are not included. This is not meant to detract from the importance of those programs. Also, the Corps of Engineers have proven by their successful completion of many civilian oriented construction projects that the Corps is capable of participating in

nationbuilding programs. For that reason, use of the Corps of Engineers is not addressed in this study except for the historical analysis in Chapter II.

In reviewing the Civilian Conservation Corps, the author found the subject to be extremely lengthy and complex. To reduce the subject to a manageable proportion, this study is limited to organization, problems, effects on the Army, and public opinions concerning the Corps--the elements that would be important today should such a concept be reinstated with Army participation.

CHAPTER I

FOOTNOTES

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CHAPTER II

MANIFEST DESTINY

When we assume the Solider,
we do not lay aside the Citizen.¹

George Washington

Most Army officers are quick to state that involvement in prolonged domestic tasks must be avoided as it detracts from the Army's primary mission of national defense. Many continue by stating the public fear of militarism also dictates the Army should not become involved. Yet in the past the Army has been involved. It seems logical that this study start by examining the precedent of Army nationbuilding and determine why the Army did get involved.

In the mid-Nineteenth Century, Americans had a great dream of manifest destiny; a United States that stretched from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean.² Not only did the Army help fulfill that dream, but active Army officers helped formulate it through their actions. Captain Meriwether Lewis and Captain William Clark traveled under War Department orders and were accompanied by at least 13 enlisted men on the famous Lewis and Clark Expedition to the Pacific Ocean. Their mission was to explore the Louisiana Purchase, and they accomplished this by blazing the first trail from the Mississippi River to the Pacific Ocean. Other Army expeditions added to the warehouse of knowledge about the West. Lieutenant Zebulon M. Pike, with a contingent of non-commissioned officers and enlisted men, explored the Northwest, and later the Southwest to gather data about

the Indians, topography, and possible military sites.³ The years between 1815 and 1845 saw the Army mapping trails that extended the American frontier westward and then helping to build the nation's roads, railroads, and canals.⁴

Men like Captain James Bonnaville provided the first reasonably accurate map of the area west of the Rocky Mountains; Captain John C. Fremont explored and described the Rocky Mountains and the Oregon Territory; and Lieutenant Robert Cooke provided a southern route from Santa Fe to San Diego. The results of these explorations were not stored and forgotten but rather made public.⁵ These writings must have encouraged many of the early settlers to go west. Were these first explorers any different from those explorers of more recent years? Today, we can add the names of Admiral Perry and Byrd to the list for their Arctic endeavors. Are not the astronauts the Lewis and Clark of the present? In every case, these explorers were searching for knowledge of the unknown and to establish the fact that they could survive in a strange environment.

AGRICULTURE

In the wilderness, there were no established sources of food or fodder; thus, the farther the Army moved from eastern civilization the more crucial became the soldiers' agricultural expertise. The Army's "farm yourself" policy changed from time to time from a minimum of kitchen gardens to a maximum of agricultural self-sufficiency. While the results of the farming effort became competitive between units, commanders and soldiers at every level objected to the

requirement to raise their own food because it interfered with their primary mission of fighting. The requirement to raise foodstuffs would vary with the amount of fighting that was required. As the Army pushed west, the soldiers spent more time fighting and less time farming.⁶

EDUCATION

Today's in-house educational system of the Armed Services is really an extension from the past. West Point, the United States Military Academy, was founded in 1802. West Point was the nation's first school of technology and was among the first in the English-speaking world. Beginning with West Point's introduction of blackboard and chalk, the military has led the academic community in the development and use of new and better classroom teaching aids.⁷ West Point graduates also filled the first engineering chairs at many civilian institutions of higher learning.

In the Northwest Territories, soldiers were often teachers for the children living closeby. As a matter of fact, the soldiers were paid extra to operate schools. In many cases, these schools were superior to those in the surrounding area, and it was not unusual for civilians to apply and receive permission for their children to attend military-sponsored schools. Later, Army Chaplains were given the responsibility for operating the schools, and they also ministered to the spiritual needs of the soldier and civilian alike. It was not unusual for the military garrison to become the nuclei of civilian church parishes in adjacent areas.⁸

The ability to teach is recognized as an essential quality for a military leader because training is so vital to successful military operations. The Army traditionally takes the boy off the oxcart and from behind the plow and teaches him to drive vehicles and to operate machinery. In more recent years, the US Armed Services have taught in excess of 1,500 skills of which 86 percent are civilian related.⁹ In addition, the Services provide off-duty liberal arts education for every level from grammar school to college. The Army's success in modern teaching methods and use of training aids has been copied by successful educators throughout the country.

CONSTRUCTION

Since West Point was the first school of engineering in the United States, it's only logical that Army engineers would be deeply involved in construction projects throughout our land. For instance, Robert E. Lee spent the greater part of his service with the United States Army as a civil engineer rather than as a soldier.¹⁰ The Army loaned engineers to assist in surveying the routes for the first transcontinental railroads. In the District of Columbia, the engineers built the Navy, War, State, and Post Office buildings; the Washington aqueduct and monument; not to forget the well known Pentagon. The engineers built roadways, waterways, and the Great Lakes Navigation System. President Teddy Roosevelt said the greatest thing about an Army officer was that he did what he was told; the President then assigned the Army to build the Panama Canal. Where others had failed, the Army succeeded; and the Canal opened in 1914.¹¹

Normally, construction projects are engineer missions. However, American soldiers have always come into the Army with certain civilian skills. These men are not always top artisans; but many are competent painters, carpenters, bricklayers, and cabinet makers. In the 1800s on the frontier, civilians with these skills were not always available; so soldiers were hired to work on construction projects. By Army Regulation soldiers who worked for ten days or more on a civilian project were entitled to extra pay.¹² In Vietnam, troops without any special training participated in the building of airfields, barracks, and other buildings. Army troops also display an ability and desire to improve their own living conditions wherever they are stationed. Those soldiers without manual skills soon develop into amateur laborers. For years the Army has taken advantage of this capability by initiating self-help programs to conserve funds allocated for maintenance and upkeep of buildings and grounds.

A recent case at Fort Wainwright, Alaska confirms the ability of the young soldier to contribute in rebuilding homes. The Army asked the citizens of Unalokleet Village how the troops could assist the town while the unit was in the area. The natives asked for help in building their new homes. The material was furnished under a federal project that required the villagers provide the labor. Seventy-five men, with no special skills, volunteered; and in about five days, they had laid floor tiles, built roofs, put up ceilings, and painted 19 homes in the community. It would be hard to convince those Alaskans that the Army serves no useful purpose.¹³

ECONOMICS

In the old west, the Army acted as an economic stimulus by doing chores that pioneer families could not or would not do. These tasks included building roads and establishing means of communications that were so necessary to growing settlements. The Army contributed to the growing local economies by purchasing goods and services. In other fields, Army directed research programs discovered a vaccine against anthrax, a way to control the boll weevil, better ways to process and preserve food, the key to the new metrecal liquid diet, and how to make synthetic rubber. A major contribution to industry, was the idea of mass production which was an outgrowth of the interchangeable parts that Eli Whitney developed for the Army Musket.¹⁴ All these advances have had reciprocal civilian benefits. One of the Army's largest economic endeavors was its contribution to administering the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter III.

SCIENCE AND MEDICINE

Some of the Army's research achievements that have not been mentioned include the process for chlorination of water, the discovery of the cause and cure for beriberi, and automatic bacteria counting. Smallpox vaccine was first used by the military in 1800 and subsequently spread into the civilian sector. An Army doctor wrote the first American textbook on psychiatry. The accomplishments of Army surgeons, General Walter Reed and General William C. Gorgas, toward the elimin-

ation of typhoid and yellow fever are well known.¹⁵ As an additional duty, early Army doctors were required to take weather observations twice each day. These observations gave the United States its first recorded temperatures, wind directions, and general weather conditions. After 1842, the observations were increased to four per day and the scope of the observations was increased to include barometer readings, amount of precipitation, the direction, force, and velocity of clouds and wind.¹⁶ In 1891, the weather observation requirement was transferred to the newly formed Department of Agriculture. Today the mission of the Weather Bureau is with the Department of Commerce, but contributions continue from all the Services.

In 1965, the Army Special Forces conducted a training exercise in Alaska which had as its objective the social betterment of the local Eskimos and Indians. The Special Forces worked with and through the Alaska Department of Health and Welfare to teach first aid, sanitation, hygiene, and nutrition to the villagers. The troops gave medical and dental assistance to persons in the order of priority established by the state. Health and hygiene literature printed at Fort Bragg was distributed to the population. Dogs and other animals were treated for rabies. These tasks were normal civic action missions that these troops were trained to accomplish while helping foreign countries with their nationbuilding. Why just in other countries? The Army reaped great publicity from the exercise, and there is one group of people in Alaska that no longer wonder what an Army does in peacetime. The people gained also.

In Gambell, 95 percent of the 400 inhabitants were examined and 8 were sent to mainland hospitals. In Tetlin the dentist extracted 50 teeth, made 53 restorations, and did 35 cleanings. . . . Nearly 100 percent of Savoonga's 397 people were given medical and dental examinations, and all the children had their teeth cleaned and were given topical flouride applications. There were 76 restorations and 326 extractions, a rather high average of 5 extractions per school child. And as for Savoonga's dog population, 120 were inoculated against rabies.¹⁷

More recently, as medical evacuation helicopters and crews were released from duty in Vietnam, a new program called Military Assistance to Safety and Traffic (MAST) was initiated as a joint project between three of the government's Executive Departments (Defense, Transportation, and Health, Education, and Welfare). The basic plan calls for MAST to be used only for evacuating those persons injured in highway accidents, but actual missions run the spectrum from heart attacks to gunshot wounds. This participation provides actual emergency training for medics and helicopter crews with an end result of public approval and accolades. Here is what one recipient had to say:

I hate to admit it now, but prior to the accident I had very little use for the military. I would think of the Army and all I could see was the killing. That one night changed me. The Army was saving lives and doing it right here in the States. What greater peacetime mission can there be for the military.¹⁸

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

In many developing countries, the military is the only group with sufficient cohesiveness and organization capable of taking political action. This was never the case in the United States

which was born politically sophisticated. Nevertheless, the Army made a significant contribution to the field of public administration.

While pioneering the virgin territories, the Army provided the framework of stable administration within which the civilian institutions flourished. The Army provided the administrative and technical know how for managing Indian affairs, the Freedman Bureau, the Panama Canal, and the Civilian Conservation Corps. More recently, the Army moved into hostile, war-torn overseas areas and set political and economic processes into motion.¹⁹

Until the War Between the States, there were no lines drawn between politics and the military service. Participating in politics was considered an officer's normal exercise of individual rights. In history, we find both Washington and Hamilton moved in and out of civil and military life at will. In 1812, the Secretary of War took command of the Army and led it against Canada.²⁰

The Office of the Presidency has attracted many military men, but in every instance the outlook of the office has remained civilian. One-half of the 36 Presidents have had military experience. Ten of that number had previously been generals in the Army.²¹ It should not be a surprise that military men do well in public office since they are public administrators by both training and profession. The Army follows the same administrative processes as the other Executive Departments in the Federal Government. When substituted for civilian administrators, military people have served admirably. During and after World War II, the United States sent uniformed, professional military men as ambassadors to Russia.²² Following the war, uniformed

professionals governed occupied areas quietly, skillfully, and in the best of democratic traditions. This success was in spite of the harsh guidelines for governing the areas that had been developed by civilian leadership.²³

On the domestic side following the war, the number of military men appointed to civilian posts aroused considerable criticism. The complaint was that the country was abandoning civilian control and becoming a garrison state. However, this was not the case. These professional officers blended into their new surroundings and did their job effectively and in a civilian manner. While their military background was not a prerequisite, their experience in management and administration set them high above any other significant group of available citizens.²⁴ This managerial talent still exists and could be put to good use by the nation.

IMPACT ON MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT

The primary mission of any army is to provide protection from external threats and to assist in the maintenance of order within the nation. In accomplishing these tasks, an army provides a shield of security behind which the nation can develop. The United States Army has provided this shield during ten external or internal wars, and nationbuilding continued through all of them.

On other occasions, the Army provided the strength by which the federal government enforced the law of the land. This was true even before that famous Force Bill was passed during President Jackson's fight with South Carolina over Nullification. Enforcement includes

the Wiskey Rebellion in Pennsylvania, fighting the War Between the States, and enforcing school integration--Little Rock, University of Mississippi, and University of Alabama. In many cases the threat of the Army was sufficient. Time and time again, the Army has answered the call for help in time of crisis. Floods, storms, earthquakes, and fires are written on the endless list.

The participation has been good for the Army and for the public, and that participation has not distracted from the primary mission. Still the Army suffers from bad public opinion of its usefulness.

ANALYSIS

Many people in American society consider the military establishment as unproductive, a drain on the economy, and a drag on social progress. An extreme radical would also include the fire department, police department, or even insurance companies as unnecessary. Each of these agencies hedge against the unplanned, undesirable, and unfortunate events that are inherent to life.²⁵ This type of thinking must be corrected before the opposition grows larger.

The public was satisfied in each of the Army's past social accomplishments. The review of those achievements also makes it apparent that the role of the Army changed as society progressed. Key to the study is the confirmation that nationbuilding is not out of character with the Army's niche in society, but rather it has always been a factor in good soldiering.

The pattern that developed during the historical review is that the Army got involved when (1) there was a recognized need, (2) the

Army provided the best vehicle for getting the job done, (3) the use of the Army was politically feasible. These three factors were evident in the 1930s as the Army suffered during the Great Depression and became involved with the Civilian Conservation Corps.

CHAPTER II

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CHAPTER III

CIVILIAN CONSERVATION CORPS

Materially we must strive to secure a broader economic opportunity for all men so that each shall have a better chance to show the stuff of which he is made. Spiritually and ethically we must strive to bring about clean living and right thinking. We appreciate that the things of the body are important; but we appreciate also that the things of the soul are immeasurably more important. The foundation stone of national life is and ever must be the high individual character of the individual citizen.¹

Theodore Roosevelt

The nationbuilding project in which the Army made the greatest contribution was the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC). As Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. wrote, the Corps, "left its monuments in the preservation and purification of the land, the water, the forests, and the young of America." It is extremely important to the story of reform in the United States as it was the first effort by the Federal Government to provide some specific solution to the problem facing youth in an increasingly urban society. It was the pathfinder for more sophisticated programs such as the National Youth Administration of the Roosevelt years and the Job Corps of the more recent War on Poverty.² The lessons learned in the CCC are invaluable to those planning a Domestic Service Corps.

In this discussion, there is little need to dwell upon the initial contributions made by the CCC to the conservation of the national wealth. Billions of trees were planted, millions of acres of land saved from erosion, and hundreds of recreation areas were developed

which stand today as permanent testimony to the Corps' success. This discussion of the Corps includes a brief background, the organization, administration, educational aspects, militarism, military training, military gains, the enrollee and the desertion problem, the effects on youth, and the CCC popularity. Finally, an analysis of the lessons learned in the CCC will be applied to the formation of a Domestic Service Corps.

BACKGROUND

The Army opposed its involvement in the CCC and became involved against its will. The depression years were hard times and it would be well to briefly examine that environment before studying the CCC. In doing so, the discussion reveals a congressional climate similar to that of today.

In the 1930s, unlike today, the Army's thinking was divorced from the social and economic problems of the country. The Depression caused social unrest and the birth of ideologies opposed to the traditional concepts in which the Army believed. Much like today, the Army was a symbol of the "establishment," and in the public's mind, shared in the responsibility for the social and economic upheaval. The Army was under constant attack as a threat to liberty and for its attempts to guide the nation into militarism. As the Army was constantly rebuked for carrying out what it considered its function of providing national defense, it withdrew more and more into purely military matters.³

Very similar to today, one portion of the Federal Budget to be examined extremely closely was military expenditures. The Army accepted this financial squeeze with the attitude that the Army was an executor and not a formulator of policy; formulation being the function of the civilian leaders of the government. However, two concepts against which the Army took strong stands were the reduction of the officer corps and participation in unemployment relief.

The author's concern for the size of the officer corps is based on past experience. One estimate stated that the lack of trained officers had delayed the United States' entry into World War I by fifteen months.⁴ The National Defense Act of 1920 hoped to overcome this deficiency by establishing a two-part defense force--a small regular Army complemented by civilian components.⁵ These civilian components included the National Guard, Reserve Officer Training Corps, and Civilian Military Training Corps. The Chief of Staff and the General Staff believed that decisiveness in battle depended on leadership and not machines. In that regard the limited funds that became available were spent on training leaders for a large expandable Army.⁶

In 1932, the Hoover Administration became concerned that the Army had too many officers for the number of enlisted men. The officer-enlisted ratio had increased from 1 to 19 before World War I to 1 to 10. The War Department said this change was the result of new technology, civilian component requirements, and staff work at higher headquarters.⁷ The action to cut the Army's officer strength was finally defeated, but the House Appropriations Committee directed

the Army to get rid of the officers that had grown too old for their grade.⁸ Later, President Roosevelt proposed a like cut in officer strength. General MacArthur hastened to point out that skilled officers were the product of continuous and laborious study. The Army could do without many things; but it must have adequate leadership, the most important element in modern warfare.⁹ President Roosevelt dropped his proposal because he wanted the Army's support in the running of the Civilian Conservation Corps.

Formation of the CCC and the initial mobilization of 250,000 men in seven weeks strained the Regular Army Officer Corps and dictated a larger Active Duty Officer Corps. General MacArthur decentralized control of officers in CCC to Corps Area Commanders. Branch schools were closed allowing 60 percent of the staff and faculty to be used in the mobilization. Almost 60 percent of the officers assigned to civilian component duty were diverted to meet the demands for CCC duty. It was also necessary to cut in half the number of officers that were scheduled for Service School attendance to fill the initial officer requirements.¹⁰ Mobilization of the CCC brought the regular Army to a standstill, and the President allowed the War Department to bring reserve officers to active duty for the purpose of running the CCC.¹¹ This use of reserve officers allowed regular Army officers to return to defense missions.

In 1935, Colonel William Major, the Army representative to the Advisory Council recommended to the Army Chief of Staff (CSA) that every active duty officer be given a six-month tour of duty with the

CCC. Colonel Major felt that there was no better opportunity in time of peace for practical training in command, administration and supply, and for the development of leadership and initiative.¹²

The reserve officers trained in the CCC were of great value during World War II. However, even with this additional group of trained officers, the shortage of skilled officers, previously forecast by the General Staff, became a reality in 1940.¹³

The other idea which the Army strongly opposed during the 1930s was its involvement in unemployment relief. The concept first arose in 1930, when a bill was introduced into Congress proposing a special reserve corps for the purpose of relieving unemployment.¹⁴ The Army opposed the idea as a threat to the integrity and stability of the military establishment. The Army feared that it would be drawn into the social and political controversies of the day. All of which would interfere with its mission of defense readiness.

In the winter of 1931-32 the Army did give the idea some thought. While it opposed accelerated enlistments, it did offer to control a public works program through the Corps of Engineers for the Hoover Administration.¹⁵ In January 1933, the Couzen's Bill was introduced into Congress which would have required the Army to feed, house, and clothe about 300,000 unemployed.¹⁶ The War Department's G3 was unenthusiastic but did study the idea. This study revealed that the Army could provide housing for only 67,000, and most of that housing was in the South while the unemployment was acute in other parts of the country. It would also be necessary to use war reserves to carry

out the task. The Army's greatest fear was the possible failure to maintain discipline over men not subject to military law, and that would result in discrediting the Army.¹⁷

On Inauguration Day, 1933, President Roosevelt directed the War Department to formulate a plan to alleviate unemployment. While organized labor, the Department of Labor and many civil groups opposed the idea, the Army became convinced that President Roosevelt had no other agency with the capability to handle the administrative and supply function. The Army suggested that it would induct and task organize personnel into work units and then send men to the project area where the units would work under the control of the federal department in charge of that particular project. That federal department would also have responsibility for administration, supply, finance, and discipline of those units. This, in the Army viewpoint, would eliminate dual control.¹⁸

On 15 March 1933, the Secretaries of War, Interior, and Labor met at the President's request to coordinate plans for a proposed Civilian Conservation Corps. The Secretaries met and forwarded a joint memorandum that the CCC should be a self-contained agency and part of a three pronged attack on the problem of industrial unemployment.¹⁹

That was the concept which the President presented to Congress on 21 March 1933.²⁰ While there were Congressional hearings which aired opposition complaints, the Emergency Conservation Work Program, popularly known as the CCC, was passed by Congress 10 days later. President Roosevelt signed the act into law on 5 April 1933.²¹

CCC ORGANIZATION

On the same day he signed the bill authorizing the CCC, the President issued Executive Order Number 6101 which: (1) appointed Robert Fechner, head of the Machinist Union, as director; (this appointment of a labor leader reduced objections from organized labor)²² (2) directed the Secretaries of War, Interior, and Agriculture to designate a representative to serve on a Advisory Council;²³ (3) assigned the task of selecting enrollees to Department of Labor; (actually the selection was to be carried out by the various states' relief and welfare organizations) (4) assigned the job of planning and supervising the work programs to the Department of Agriculture; (5) gave to the War Department the responsibility of paying, housing, clothing, feeding, and providing medical care for the enrollees.²⁴

ARMY ORGANIZATION

The Army had organized the country into nine Corps Areas.²⁵ From the beginning, it was General MacArthur's plan to decentralize control and allow each Corps Area Commander as much discretion and autonomy as possible.²⁶ The General Staff directed that a work camp would consist of a CCC Company under a Regular Army Officer, three commissioned officers from the reserve on Active Duty, one Regular Army non-commissioned officer as company first sergeant, one supply sergeant, one mess sergeant, and an enlisted cook. A district headquarters with a commander, executive officer, an adjutant, medical officer, and chaplain would oversee several companies.²⁷

Medical care was provided by assigning one medical officer per two or three camps, each with about 200 enrollees.²⁸ The conservation agency of the department responsible for the work project provided a camp superintendent who was responsible for the men while engaged in that work.²⁹ The superintendent was normally assisted by five to twelve civilian foremen.³⁰

Initially the Army was charged with accepting the enrollees at recruiting stations, transporting them to the nearest Army camp for four weeks of conditioning, and then turning the enrollees over to other agencies. Army training was limited to building up "physique and unit esprit."³¹ The Forest Service was to build and operate the work camps, but it soon became obvious that the Army would have to become more involved than originally planned. Where the Army's role formerly ended with the recruits' arrival at work camps, the responsibility for the entire CCC project was transferred to the Army under the general supervision of the Director. The Army accepted the expanded mission without enthusiasm, realizing that it was the only agency capable of accomplishing the task.³²

VETERANS

There were many veterans of World War I who were also unemployed. Many of these men had reached the point of hopelessness and unrest. Executive Order 6129, issued 11 May 1933, authorized the enrollment of 25,000 war veterans without restriction to age or marital status. These men were housed in separate camps, and they benefited from the educational and medical programs. Most of these veterans regained

health and self-respect. Armed with their new skills, these veterans regained the courage to face the world with confidence and the ability to earn a decent living.³³

ADMINISTRATION

The CCC was hastily conceived, experimental; and there was no precedent to follow. The relationship between the Director and the four cooperating federal departments was similar to a holding company with four larger components. The Director was to coordinate their efforts and had four liaison officers to work at the four departments.³⁴

For the first four years, Fechner allowed the departments to operate according to their own methods and traditions. However, as he began to feel more secure, he began to extend his authority over the technical services and the War Department.³⁵ The Director's plan to centralize vehicle repair shops under CCC caused a controversy which was eventually resolved by the President in favor of Fechner. The Director was within his limits of authority, but the controversy damaged the relationship that had spurred the initial success of the CCC.³⁶

In the same Executive Order that appointed Fechner, an Advisory Council was formed. This council was to provide a platform where opposing points of view could be heard and reconciled. As other agencies such as Veterans Administration, Office of Indian Affairs, and Office of Education became officially connected, they sent representatives. The council grew so large it was unable to function.

Fechner cut the council back to 10 representatives, its original size. The number included the Director, Deputy Director, and two representatives from each of the four departments involved.³⁷

In general, the War Department restricted its role to administering policy, not formulating or criticizing it.³⁸ However, when the officer corps was involved, the War Department always took a strong stand. Such a situation existed in 1937.

A Reserve officer's tour of duty with the CCC was supposed to be six months, but it was almost always extended indefinitely.³⁹ By 1937, the Army was convinced that the CCC experience was of real value to the Reserve officers employed in CCC camps. To spread the benefits, the decision was made to replace the officers who had been on duty for more than eighteen months with a new group of younger officers. The officers being replaced considered the move to be a "callously brutal attempt to throw out of employment over 6,000 officers, most of them with families." Fechner was unable to get the Army to change its order, so he appealed to the President. He pointed out that mass replacement would have ill effects on CCC morale.

The War Department finally agreed to change only 50 percent of the officers concerned, but the Army was upset that Fechner got involved with strictly a departmental issue.⁴⁰ This conflict combined with the issue of centralization of vehicle repair facilities thoroughly alienated the War Department which redoubled its efforts to be removed from the CCC Organization; however, the President would not release the Army.

In 1939, over the President's objection, Congress gave full disability benefits to Reserve officers on duty with CCC. The

financial cost was so great that the President decided to replace the officers with civilians to be selected by the War Department from the Reserve Officer's List. It was merely a change in status rather than personnel. The War Department remained in charge of the camps.⁴¹

In 1939, a reorganization of government agencies was approved by Congress. The CCC was to come under the Federal Security Agency because of its promotion of welfare and education. Fechner protested, pleading with the President to allow the CCC to continue as an independent agency responsible directly to the President. If that was not possible, then the CCC should be in the Federal Works Agency. As far as Fechner was concerned, the CCC was a "self-contained work agency." However, he was unsuccessful in changing the image of the CCC from that of a relief agency.⁴²

The day was bound to arrive when the requirement for a relief agency would no longer exist. Fechner's reluctance to plan for that event was instrumental in the CCC never becoming a permanent agency. Another contributing factor to its temporary nature was the CCC's conservatism which is attributed to both Fechner and the Army. Fechner's union training to conciliate and suggest was completely

ferent from Roosevelt's New Deal reformers who were trained to innovate. The responsibility for camp management was in the hands of the Army, the least radical group in the country.⁴³ This explains why the Army and the Director opposed the introduction of "long haired men and short haired women" into the Corps to carry out an educational program.⁴⁴

EDUCATIONAL ENDEAVORS

In December 1933, an educational program was initiated in the CCC with an educational director in charge at each camp.⁴⁵ This endeavor was an afterthought, and education was accommodated if possible but omitted if necessary.⁴⁶ During June 1933, Fechner had disapproved a plan for implementing an educational program. The Army, fearing radical and leftist infiltration of CCC camps, strongly supported the Director.⁴⁷ As the idea gained more and more support in Washington, the Army changed its tactics and proposed a modified plan which was approved. As a result, the Army controlled the education through the Corps Area Commanders.⁴⁸ However, some officials in Washington insisted that the program was started in spite of the Army.⁴⁹

The problems the educators had to contend were tremendous. There were 250,000 youths whose education ranged from no formal schooling to college degrees. The teacher seldom had an office or a classroom, and most instruction was accomplished in mess halls.⁵⁰ These problems and the resulting criticism caused Fechner to appoint a special committee in 1938 to examine the educational program. The committee was critical of conditions, facilities, and of the Army, and recommended a change of emphasis from liberal arts education to vocational and on-the-job training.⁵¹ The committee failed to mention the good work done. By June 1937, 35,000 men had been taught to read and write, 1,000 men had graduated from high school and 39 from college.⁵²

In the field of vocational or on-the-job training, the results were very good. Men learned how to handle pioneer tools and heavy machinery, how to read and draw blueprints; and some became skilled mechanics.⁵³ There was much good work done, but the CCC failed to grasp this golden opportunity to extend its benefits through education. The CCC should have given more emphasis to a program for placing discharged enrollees into civilian jobs. The CCC's limited attempt was very successful, but both the men and country would have gained from a more comprehensive program.⁵⁴

MILITARISM

The public fear of militarism was proclaimed from the very first mention that the Army would be involved in the CCC. Every effort was made by the Administration and the Army to squelch the idea, but militarism remained an issue through the life of CCC.

Official literature concerning the CCC carefully spelled out that a person did not enlist in the Army when he enrolled: he would not receive military training, nor would he be subject to military law.⁵⁵ The effects of this public attitude was to prohibit the use of normal Army disciplinary methods even though there was a necessity for discipline.⁵⁶ The War Department notified the Corps Area Commanders that members of the CCC had civilian status and would be turned over to civilian authorities for offenses which constituted a violation of civil laws. However, the Army officer in charge of each camp was given the authority to discharge an enrollee for refusal to work, continuous or serious misconduct, or unwillingness to abide by rules

and regulations.⁵⁷ The Army was satisfied with this arrangement and believed its regulations were fair and consistent with the civilian nature of the program.⁵⁸ The Secretary of the Interior, Harold Ickes, felt it was impossible to say if there was too much Army atmosphere in the Corps, but he took it for granted that some sort of discipline was necessary.⁵⁹

The Army and Fechner had a serious disagreement concerning the reinstatement of enrollees discharged by the Army for breaches of regulations. Fechner reinstated about 50 percent, and the Army considered the action as damaging to its authority. The matter was finally settled by compromise of positions. Fechner became more strict and the Army a little more lenient.⁶⁰

Protection of individual liberty went far beyond what would be envisioned today. For example, the War and Justice Departments wanted compulsory fingerprinting, but the President was against the idea.⁶¹ The Army suppressed the National Riflemen's Association's idea of sport shooting in the camps for fear that it might inflame ideas of militarism with the public.⁶²

MILITARY TRAINING

In February 1935, General MacArthur proposed that enrollees be given an opportunity to volunteer for two months military training after completing the six month enrollment in the CCC. Upon completion of the training, the man could enlist in an auxiliary reserve corps which would supplement the Regular Army upon mobilization.⁶³ The idea was strongly opposed by the public which protested to Congress

and the President. The idea failed to materialize, but the proponents for military training were not to be silenced.

By the outbreak of World War II, military training in the CCC had firm press and popular support. A Gallup Poll indicated 90 percent of those surveyed favored military activity in the CCC.⁶⁴ By now both Fechner and the Army were opposed to the idea. The Army stated the training would interfere with CCC work, weapons training was not possible in many camps; and the administrative load resulting from a reserve corps would exceed the benefit to national security.⁶⁵ The Army position was key to the idea not being implemented.

The proponents of military training changed their tactics and pushed for training in non-combative specialties such as cooking, demolition, road/bridge construction, radio operation, and signal communication. There was 20 hours per week of this training which was deductible from work hours. By September 1940, the plan was fully operative and through its provisions, the CCC made its most significant contribution to national defense.⁶⁶

BONUS FOR DEFENSE

The Army eventually decided that CCC could be an acceptable substitute for military training. Fechner believed the enrollee was about 85 percent prepared for military life.⁶⁷ The enrollee learned the basic essentials of Army knowledge; how to live in companies of men with rules and time schedules, how to take care of himself and his equipment, sanitation, hygiene, obedience, and teamwork. Work, good food, regular sleep, and good medical care made the men

physically tough and mentally alert on an equal with men having a year of military training.⁶⁸ This group cooperation and orderly living was the first step in military training.

Secretary of War Dern reported at a Cabinet meeting that the CCC was the most valuable experience the Army ever had. It was a new problem for conventionally trained officers. "They have had to learn to govern men by leadership, explanation, and diplomacy rather than discipline. That knowledge is priceless to the American Army."⁶⁹

After the United States entered the war, the CCC helped the war effort by performing useful work on military posts, protecting national forests, and by providing partially trained men for the Armed Forces.⁷⁰

THE ENROLLEE AND DESERTION

The average enrollee was 19 years old, had completed eight and one quarter years of school, and spent an average of one year in the CCC.⁷¹ Physical requirements dictated that men must be free of disease and able to perform ordinary labor. Mentally, the men had to be able to adjust to camp life, follow instructions, and be able to take advantage of training and educational opportunities. There were no promises made regarding assignment to a particular one of the 1,500 camps.⁷²

When the first reenrollment time arrived, about 60 percent of the men reenrolled, which speaks well for the CCC.⁷³ On the other hand, by April 1937, 18.8 percent of all enrollees had been discharged for desertion. As a partial solution, Fechner felt the minimum age of

years old should be raised to 18 years. The Army leadership was blamed to some degree for the desertion problem, and there were some in the Army that felt stronger punitive measures could help. It appears the main cause of the desertion was fear of the unknown. None of the agencies involved made any effort to mentally prepare the young men for the rapid transfer from their highly industrialized society to a completely rural environment.⁷⁴ A well planned orientation program would have probably helped ease the swift transition from the city to the rural, Army camp.⁷⁵

EFFECTS ON YOUTH

For that 81 percent who adjusted to the CCC and its way of life, things were different. In 1933, President Roosevelt predicted that the CCC "would graduate a fine group of strong young men trained to self-discipline and willing and proud to work." Three years later he claimed he had not misjudged the loyalty, spirit, industry or the temper of American youth.⁷⁶

The CCC rekindled hope for the future and faith in the American way of life. The Corps provided tangible benefits to health, educational level, and employment expectancies.⁷⁷ This particular value cannot be estimated in dollars and cents. Yet in 1941, the CCC's per capita cost for an enrollee was a mere \$1,004.⁷⁸

Another tremendous benefit of disciplined camp life and reliable leadership was the reduction in reported crime in big cities. Judge Maurice Broude of Chicago estimated that the CCC had reduced crime in that city by 50 percent. The New York Commissioner of Correction credited the CCC with a similar decrease in juvenile crime.⁷⁹

POPULARITY

The Corps never really became unpopular, it simply outlived its usefulness as a relief agency in a wartime economy.⁸⁰ It was supported by Labor, the Army, and the public.

Organized Labor protested the original proposal on several grounds. In particular was the concern that the Army was in the act, a connection that Labor feared would lead to the "regimentation of labor" under military control and to Army wage rates.⁸¹ Norman Thomas warned that "such work-camps fits into the psychology of a Fascist, not a Socialist state." Actually the opposite turned out to be true. That "low" dollar-a-day rate for enrollees was a third more money than the soldiers working in the camps were paid. This deficiency was never resolved and it continued to be an Army morale problem throughout the life of the CCC.⁸² Congress got around Labors's objections by passing a vague bill, leaving implementation to the President. President Roosevelt handled Labor stressing that the Corps was relief measure. Then to further allay their fears, he appointed a Labor leader as director.⁸³

From a political viewpoint, the CCC was bipartisan. Both Presidential hopefuls endorsed the CCC in 1936.⁸⁴ The placement of a camp could increase the prestige of the local Congressman among his constituents. The fact that it provided a source of patronage could have been another contributing factor in the defeat of the bill to make the CCC a permanent agency, since as a permanent agency, employment would have come under Civil Service and not be subject to congressional appointment.⁸⁵

ANALYSIS

The CCC was the nation's first effort to solve the young man's problems in fast growing urban areas. In contrast with today's Army which is more cognizant and involved in social problems, the Army had withdrawn from society during the 1930s. The CCC got the Army involved. The Army opposed its involvement in unemployment relief as this would interfere with the primary mission of defense preparedness. Nevertheless, the Army was the most convenient, economical, and effective agency available. As one writer pointed out: "In the breakneck pace of the New Deal it was impossible to examine closely the principle that it is better for civilians to run their jobs poorly than for Army men to run civilians well."⁸⁶ The Army became more enthusiastic about the CCC as it realized the bonus the operation was paying in officer training, training in non-combat specialties, and favorable publicity. Participation also had the effect of increasing the size of the officer corps by 9,000 reserve officers, a 75 percent increase in total number on Active Duty.

LESSON LEARNED

In a discussion of a Domestic Service Corps, the lessons learned in the CCC would be extremely valuable. These include:

1. The Army prior planning for participation in unemployment relief allowed the Army to obtain more favorable positions within the CCC.

2. The vagueness of the Congressional Bill that established the Corps proved most valuable. The Executive Department was able to

quickly establish a workable organization. It was not necessary to go back to Congress for permission to change some procedure.

3. That when there is a need to use the Army in an unorthodox role, the Federal Government will do so. That role can be expanded should another department fall short in its capabilities.

4. Mobilization requires a much larger officer corps than Congress is willing to acknowledge. Mobilizing the initial 250,000 enrollees in only seven weeks brought all activities of the Regular Army to a standstill.

5. Unity of command and authority should be implemented early in the program. The organizational structure of the CCC was unbelievably awkward, but it worked. If power had been more centralized with the Director from the beginning, several internal power struggles would have been prevented. As a general rule, the Director accepted the Army's advice; but in the last analysis, the Director had the final decision.

6. Participation of officers with civilian agencies should be fixed in length of tour, and that period conformed to rigidly, preventing misunderstandings between departments.

7. The charge of militarism will be sounded anytime Army personnel have visibility in a program. The charge of militarism was heard for the entire nine year life of the Corps. However, this charge was heard from a small opposition group. Regimentation of labor never occurred. It was wise to turn to the civil authority to prosecute the enrollees for crimes committed.

8. The educational effort should be a definite program and be included from the beginning. The educational effort in the CCC was an afterthought, and the organization failed to take advantage of the situation. However, the final program, centered around vocational training, did work. This program should be given during the normal work hours, and the subjects taught should be non-combative specialties.

9. The Army and the nation missed a golden opportunity in not establishing the enlisted reserve program proposed by General MacArthur.

10. Participation in the CCC experiment assisted the Army in World War II mobilization. CCC "veterans" were about 85 percent trained for military life. It provided excellent training in leadership and management for the participating officers.

11. The minimum age of 18 should have been established for enrollment. This minimum age combined with a comprehensive orientation program would have reduced desertion within the Corps.

12. The Army's involvement raised the image of the Army in the public's eye, and it got the Army more involved in society.

CHAPTER XII

FOOTNOTES

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49. Harold L. Ickes, The First Thousand Days, 1933-1936, p. 80.
50. Salmond, p. 51.
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64. Ibid., p. 195.
65. Killigrew, pp. XIII-40-41.
66. Salmond, p. 196.
67. Ekirch, p. 239.
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78. Ibid., p. 112.
79. Ibid., p. 217.
80. Perkins, p. 177.
81. Salmond, p. 14.
82. Ibid., p. 16.
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86. Ekirch, p. 239.
87. Killigrew, p. XIV-4.

CHAPTER 1V

THE DOMESTIC SERVICE CORPS

. . . The new generation of military leaders have shown an increasing awareness that armies cannot only defend their countries--they can help build them.¹

President John F. Kennedy

Thus far, this study has examined historical aspects to determine if there is a precedent for participating in domestic action. Having answered that question in the affirmative, a case study was conducted of the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC). The time draws near when the key question of whether or not the Army should become involved in the operation of a Domestic Service Corps (DSC). Of course that decision would depend upon the organization of that DSC. For the purpose of this study, the author postulates a DSC wherein the Army could gain the most advantages with the least impact on its primary mission--national defense. A scenario will be used as a vehicle to describe the formation and organization of the DSC.

DOMESTIC SERVICE CORPS

Unemployment continues to worsen, and the rate of crime in urban areas continues to increase. Newspapers have begun to editorialize for a modern version of the CCC. The papers quote the success of the CCC, and noting how it reduced both crime and unemployment. The Evening Sentinel of Carlisle, Pennsylvania on 30 September 1972 stated:

It's time to start an Environmental Conservation Corps. Whatever its expense, it would reduce

the cost of law enforcement. The improvement it could make to the environment and to the corpsmen would be a big bonus.²

The cry taken up by the larger papers soon caused Congress to act. Using great wisdom and the courage to express convictions, Congress took the unusual step of preparing its own legislation for enactment of a DSC Act. Except for designating who would serve, the bill was sufficiently vague to allow the President the freedom to design the administrative structure to supervise a two-part DSC. One part of the Corps would be called the Urban Service Group and would work for the Department of Housing and Urban Development. The other part of the corps is named the Environment Service Group.

Inequity of service has always been a complaint against the way the Selective Service was implemented. Congress eliminated the possibility of this complaint with the DSC by making the service requirement uniform across the land and specifying that there would be no deferments. Every youth at the beginning of the senior year of high school or on his 17th birthday, if he is a high school drop-out, is required to register for domestic service. During the year following high school graduation, the youth, if physically and mentally fit, would serve eight months in domestic service. Since the DSC is a microcosm of society and extremely large in size, any youth who could be productive in civilian life is accepted for service.

The Domestic Service is considered a tax in kind to resolve a national manpower problem. Military training is prohibited in the Corps. However, vocational training is mandatory in defense related skills such as radio/telephone operation and repair, first aid,

motor vehicle repair, aeronautical engineering, and so forth. If a trainee completes such a course in a military school, the trainee is offered enlisted reserve rating of E-4 or E-5. If he accepts, his name is kept in a manpower pool to be used in case of national mobilization.

The military services, having failed in an all volunteer force, requested that Congress provide special inducements to encourage enlistments in the Regular Army. As a result, Congress included provisions in the Act that awarded four years GI Bill educational benefits to those youths serving at least one year in the military in addition to the eight months domestic service. Those so desiring could volunteer for sixteen months service in one of the Armed Services, not serve in the DSC, and get the educational benefits. The trainees would not be guaranteed a specific Service or even that they would be accepted since authorized manning levels could not be exceeded. This action allows the Service to get more highly educated recruits since those youths would be college oriented. This would also allow the Services to be more selective in choosing manpower.

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

As already mentioned, the organizational structure and administrative procedures for the DSC were left to the discretion of the President. The President formed an ad hoc committee consisting of the Secretaries of Health, Education, and Welfare; Housing and Urban Development; and Defense to develop a concept for implementing the DSC Act. The lessons learned in the CCC were guiding lights in the

writing the provisions that were finally published in an Executive Order. In organizing the Corps, the President approved the ad hoc committee's recommendation that the responsibilities for running the Corps be divided among the Executive Departments, and those Departments would be responsible to the President through normal organizational channels. In doing this, the awkward Advisory Council arrangement of the CCC was avoided. Each Department would run their portion of the program without interference from other Departments. In the thirty to forty years since the CCC, the country has become more urbanized, so greater emphasis and numbers of trainees would be applied to the Urban Service Group.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE

HEW is responsible for the induction, orientation, and preparation of the new trainee. During this initial two-week period, the trainee begins a physical training program that will continue the entire term of service. Aptitude testing and interviews are conducted to determine which of the available vocations would best suit the trainee. Those trainees with the aptitude and desire could volunteer for vocational training at one of the Service Schools depending on the availability of unused military allocations. Trainees attending those schools as civilians would not get credit for military duty toward GI Bill benefits and would incur an extra obligation of one day of service for each day of school. Trainees would be subject to non-judicial military justice while attending military schools. (Making the trainee subject to non-judicial military justice required additional

legislative action by Congress.) HEW divides the remaining trainees into two groups for assignment to HUD and Urban Service or Interior and Environmental Service.

Throughout their tour of service, HEW offers the trainees voluntary, off-duty educational programs in the various camps. The programs are administered in conjunction with civilian educational institutions and includes courses in grammar school through undergraduate college.

DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

The Urban Service Group is the larger of the two because of the program's emphasis on cities. The Urban Service trainee would be under the control of HUD and would live in a DSC camp located on a military post near the urban area where he was assigned to work. HUD projects would run the spectrum from cleaning up the ghetto to construction work on newly designed public living areas. The trainee would receive twelve hours of formal vocational training each week during duty hours. This training would be in addition to normal on-the-job training. There was some discussion of making the vocational training off duty, but the lesson learned in the CCC convinced the opposition to allow the training to be conducted during duty hours.

DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR

The environmental trainee also lives in a DSC camp on a military post near his work area. Interior projects run the gamut from simple

cleaning of streams and lakes to assisting engineers in cleaning or purifying industrial and human waste being emitted into the environment. Formal vocational training is conducted in the same manner as in the Urban Service Corps--to consume twelve work hours per week. That training is also in addition to on-the-job training.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Because of its vast resources of manpower, real estate, and educational facilities, the Department of Defense (DOD) was required to make large contributions to the DSC without becoming directly involved. This arrangement was at the insistence of DOD. With elimination of direct involvement, there are very few charges of militarism. The military desired to participate in a low key manner; thus preventing derogatory publicity.

The Department of Defense had initially objected to participation in the DSC based on the desire to apply full attention to the defense of the country. After reviewing the history of the CCC and taking note of the advantages, DOD now gives full support of the program. The Chief Executive and Congress assured the Army that manpower required to participate would be authorized above normal manning levels.

It was in manpower, specifically the officer corps, that DOD received greatest benefit. With an eye on the bonus effect for national defense, the President decided that DOD would provide managerial talent to the various departments on a reimbursable basis. The Secretary of Defense directed that officers and senior non-commissioned officers would be detailed to DSC duty for two to four year periods.

After completion of that civilian clothes duty, the officer attends the next appropriate level military school and is assigned to Active Army units in the field for renewal of military skills. It is anticipated that an officer will have two such tours in the first twenty years of his career. It should be noted that "members of the Army detailed for duty with agencies of the United States outside of the Department of Defense on a reimburseable basis are not counted in computing strengths under law."³

The Army alone has 1,500 installations of which fifty are inactive and 78 declared excess. Some of these are near urban areas.⁴ As a result, DOD was also directed to provide real estate as required to the other three departments for use in establishing camps for the trainees. Ownership of the areas remains with DOD, but improvements and maintenance expenses are to be borne by the using department. At first DOD objected to this arrangement, but it soon became apparent that the reduction in operation and maintenance funds would definitely be to the military's advantage. It was felt that the DSC would probably have the funds to maintain the facilities better than the Army would be able to on a caretaker basis. Besides, DOD had little choice in the matter. The President pointed out that if the country is mobilized, there would be no doubt that the facilities would be returned to DOD. However, DOD realized that if a peacetime requirement was developed, it is doubtful that DOD would be able to retrieve the property from the DSC.

DOD was instructed to expand the capacity of certain service schools teaching civilian vocations in accordance with the national

needs for specific skilled labor as determined by the Department of Labor. The capacity of these schools will vary on an annual basis depending upon the criticalness of skills within the civilian labor market. This is definitely to the advantage of the military since the schools are operating at a higher than normal peacetime rate. This allows the schools to have instructors, teaching facilities, and support elements on a semi-mobilization basis thereby saving valuable mobilization time.

Finally, since DOD was the only department that had the capability and experience, the President directed DOD to procure, receive, store, retrieve, and issue the amount of supplies envisioned for the DSC. The mission was further delegated by the Secretary of Defense to the Defense Supply Agency (DSA). The Defense Supply Agency enlarged its operation to provide the supplies required for the DSC. While all goods are not identical to those used in war, the procedures and methods of procuring, receiving, storing, and retrieving those goods are similar to wartime operation. Of necessity, the manning level at DSC is higher, resulting in a higher skill level on the job for mobilization day. In essence, this allows the DSA to operate on a partial mobilization basis; however, there is one real danger. The requirement to support the DSC can become so great that the defense mission would be dwarfed in comparison. This could lead to the Defense Supply Agency becoming the Domestic Service Supply Agency, which would be to the detriment of the defense mission.

ANALYSIS

Thus, the Domestic Service Corps: radical perhaps, but one in which the military could participate and thrive. With timely preparation, perhaps DOD could influence any legislative proposals that may be made in the future. In the past, the Army has never avoided radical ideas such as Negro fighting units, integration, and helicopter warfare. Realizing the need, the Army prepares a program and implements it.

The benefits for the nation's youth, urban areas, and countryside are evident. However, the key question here is how the military would benefit in accomplishing its defense mission. Since a large standing military force is not financially feasible nor acceptable to the public, a rapid mobilization becomes extremely important should the country become militarily threatened. "Rapid" must be taken in today's context since those two oceans no longer provide the protection for leisurely mobilization.

The youth involved in the DSC would learn to live and work together as a group. The group should be physically fit, and many would have learned defense-related skills. Intermingled with those DSC trainees would be active duty officers who are trained and ready to react to any situation. Both factors would greatly reduce mobilization time.

Another important gain would be the increased size of the officer corps for peacetime military operations. It is impossible to estimate how much larger from such a general proposal. However, recall that

for the CCC experience 9,000 officers were used, and that corps was not set up to accommodate the entire youth population of the country. By careful career management, the officer corps could be highly trained and professional, which would provide a framework upon which to rapidly expand. Unlike the Vietnam expansion, the Army would have a pool of experienced officers to help the Army avoid leadership errors similar to those that have plagued the Army during that war.

A bonus factor would be the experience the officer and NCO corps would receive in the new approach to leadership required for participation in the DSC. The military leaders on duty with the other departments would still be leading men and managing the large numbers of men and amounts of other resources, training which is important to the Army. There would be two major differences. The emphasis in the DSC would probably be on management rather than leadership. The weak leader would soon come to the surface once he was exposed to the DSC and did not have the UCMJ to back his orders. In both respects, improvements in leadership abilities are always welcome and necessary in the officer and non-commissioned officer corps.

Finally, the enlisted reserve corps would provide military related skills for mobilization. Even without the enlisted reserve, records could be maintained of DSC trained personnel which could be used to speed up mobilization.

While there are disadvantages to participating in a Domestic Service Corps, the advantages outweigh the disadvantages so as to

favor participation if the corps is designed as the one postulated here. In short, the Army should become involved.

CHAPTER IV

FOOTNOTES

1. Harry F. Walterhouse, A Time to Build, 1964, title page.
2. "Time for ECC Corps," The Evening Sentinel, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 30 September 1972, p. 4.
3. Jay B. Durst, LTC, Peaceful Uses for Military Forces, p. 5.
4. Title 10--Armed Forces, US Code, Vol. II, sec. 3012, 3230, 1964.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

As this study comes to a close, it is necessary to review the questions that initiated it.

Could the Army be used to administer a Domestic Service Corps and still provide its share for the defense of the United States? Assuming an affirmative answer, how should the Army participate? What advantages would the Army accrue from the participation?

CONCLUSIONS

(1) That the Army could not administer a Domestic Service Corps and still provide its share for the national defense unless that DSC were designed to provide advantages to the military. While nationbuilding has always been a factor in good soldiering, the role of the Army has changed as society changed. In the past, the Army has been used when there was a recognized need, when there was no other vehicle for accomplishing the task, or when it was politically feasible to use the Army. Even if these factors were present, the Army would still be subject to charges of militarism. In today's society, there are civilian agencies that are capable of overseeing a DSC; and those are the ones the nation should use. It would be desirable from both a national and a DOD point of view to have Army participation as was described in the preceding chapter.

(2) That participation in a DSC, if low key, would actually enhance the defense mission while not antagonizing the public or

other executive departments. The best way to contribute, then, is to loan real estate, personnel, and to provide logistical support on a cost reimbursable method.

ADVANTAGES

Certain advantages will result from participation in a DSC on a reimbursable basis. This participation would:

- (1) Have the least impact on the Army's primary mission of defense.
- (2) Provide the country with a partially mobilized force of 18 year old youths and Army leaders at all times.
- (3) Present the opportunity for excellent leadership and managerial training to officers in a peacetime environment.
- (4) Increase the size of the trained, Active Duty Officer Corps, thus reducing leadership problems in a mobilized Army.
- (5) Keep a larger portion of the Army's school complex in operation, reducing mobilization time.
- (6) Dictate a larger, better-manned supply facility in DSA, thus enhancing mobilization.
- (7) Provide a pool of young men trained in military-related specialties that could be used by a mobilized country.
- (8) The educational benefits of the GI Bill would be used to enhance enlistments into the Military Services.

DISADVANTAGES

The disadvantages of participation in a DSC of the type described in Chapter IV are minimal. The reason, of course, is that DSC was designed to benefit the Army. Even so, there are some disadvantages:

(1) The Army would lose peacetime control of some installations and facilities.

(2) There is a danger that the DSA could develop into a Domestic Service Supply Agency to the detriment of the Department of Defense.

(3) There is a possibility that once the DSC was a functioning agency, the other departments might not be able to manage it properly. Should that happen, the President could again (as in the case of the CCC) turn to the Army to play a larger role.

(4) Deviations from the postulated Corps could easily occur and could be to the detriment of defense. For example, Congress could require the Army to provide its share of manpower from within existing manning levels. In that case, the Army would cease to be a fighting force.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That the Army closely examine every aspect of a Domestic Service Corps to determine how to best structure such an organization to the Army's advantage. As in the 1930s, the Army would then be ready to present its views to the President and to Congress, thus securing a more favorable program that avoids the deficiencies of yesterday's programs.

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